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Abstract
This thesis deals with the aspects in English and German in connection
with Aktionsarten and tenses.
In Chap. 1, definitions of Aktionsarten, aspects and tenses are given in a
schema.
In Chap. 2, it's argued that the time point semantics is insufficient to
describe the temporal phenomena precisely. The two proponents of the
extended version of the time point semantics - interval semantics and event
calculus - are compared, and the former is adopted as a basic semantic
instrument of this thesis. And its augmented version, called the Aspectual
Logic (AL), is used in the following chapters.
In Chap. 3, the temporal phenomena of English are analyzed. The
Aktionsarten are described by means of meaning postulates. In order to
grasp the semantic nature of aspects and tenses, the Reichenbachian three
time points - E (time of event), R (time of reference), and S (time of speech)
- are introduced. And the aspect is defined as a category which determines
E from R, and the tense as the category which determines R from S. Then the
English aspects - progressive, perfect, and predetermined future - are
analyzed in terms of the two basic aspects, perfective and imperfective.
Further, it's argued that there are three categories of termporal adverbs
in English, tense adverbs, aspect adverbs, and perfect adverbs. Then, the
mutual functions and some logical conclusions of the temporal expressions
are considered.
In Chap. 4, the semantic characteristics of German temporal expressions
are analyzed in contrast with English. And it's argued that, in German,
there are three categories of tenses - past, present, and future, but only
two aspects - perfect, and predetermined future -, and only one category of
temporal adverbs - aspect adverbs. From this, it's concluded that English
is - as to the temporal expressions - more analytical than German.
Conversely, the latter supplements the lack with pragmatic elements.
In Chap. 5, the formal definitions of. AL are resumed.
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1. An Informal Definition of Aktionsart, Aspect, and Tense
The temporal expressions which are discussed in this thesis consist of the
following four categories: 1) Aktionsart, 2) aspect, 3) tense, 4) temporal
adverbs. 1) and 4) are lexical categories, and 2), 3) are grammatical
categories. 1), 2), 3) are basic categories which every sentence obligatorily
contains. 4) optionally appear in sentences. 4) are treated in Chap. 3, 4
and 5. In this Chapter, I give an informal definition of 1), 2), 3).
The term " Aktionsart " (pl. " Aktionsarten " ) stems from German, and
means a way of action, i.e. how a state of affairs develops along the time
axis. As to the classification of the Aktionsarten, various proposals have
been presented untill now. But here, I adopt the Vendler-Classification,
which Vendler(1967:Chap.4) conceived, and Dowty(1979) made precise. It
classifies the Aktionsarten of verbs into the four patterns: stative,
activity, accomplishment, and achievement.
Dowty(1979) formalizes them in meaning postulates as MP.2-5 in 5.6. But
their intuitive meaning is as follows:
(1) a) Stative:
	>t
(2) John is a student.
b) Activity:
(3) John is running in the park.
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c) Achievement:
	>t
(4) John died.
d) Accomplishment:
(5) John painted a picture.
The stative means a duration of a state, e.g., (2) means a duration of
John's being a student. The activity also means a duration of a state, but
it's not a static state, but a kinetic one. Precisely, it means an amorphous
change of static states. (3) means an alternative change of the state that
John's right leg is forward, and the state that John's left leg is forward.
The achievement means a change of a state into another state. (4) means a
change of the state that John is alive into the state that John is dead. The
accomplishment is a composition of the activity and the achievement, i.e. it
means that an activity causes an achievement. (5) means that John's motion
of a paintbrush brings about the existence of a picture.
Vendler says that the Aktionsart is expressed by a verb. But in reality,
it's expressed by the whole sentence. E.g.,
(6) John ran in the park
is an activity sentence. But
(6') John ran to the gate
is an accomplishment sentence. Therefore, in a precise discussion, we must
consider not the Aktionsart of a verb, but the whole sentence.
The aspect is a way of viewing the Aktionsart. The two basic aspects are
the perfective and the imperfective (s. Comrie(1976)). The perfective
describes the Aktionsart as a whole, but the imperfective describes it
partially. See the following sentences:
(5) John painted a picture,
(5') John was painting a picture.
(5) describes the propositional content of (5) _ as a completed event, but (5')
describes it in progress, i.e. when the speaker saw John, he had been
painting the picture, and he would be painting it further. In Chap. 3, we
treat the three aspects, progressive, perfect, and predetermined future.
They are derived from the basic aspects, the perfective and the
imperfective.1
As for tenses, I simply assume that the present, past and future set up an
Aktionsart with a certain aspect at, before, and after the time of speech
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respectively.
The differences between the Aktionsart, the aspect, and the tense are
illustrated as follows.
(7) a) Aktionsart:
b) Aspect: 1)
	 2)
[perfective]	 Cimperfective]
c) Tense:
time of speech         
t   
[past] [present] [future]
The cow in (7a) means that the Aktionsart is often a " temporal "
individual with an internal structure. E.g., John's painting a picture in (5)
is an individual called an event which occupies a time interval. And devided
into sub-intervals, it's not the event of (5) any more.
(7b1) observes the Aktionsart perfectively, (7b2) imperfectively.
The tense is a location of the Aktionsart with some aspects in past,
present, or future.
2. Logical Apparatus for Temporal Expressions
Prior(1967), the pioneer of tense logic, analyzed the tense analogous to
the modal logic as follows:
(8) Hp,
PP,
Gp,
Fp.
Hier, p stands for a sentence radical, i.e. a sentence without tense and
aspect. And the operators H' , P' , ` G' , 'F' mean 'it was always the
case that ...	 'it was the case that ...' , 'it will always be the case that
,	 it will be the case that ...' respectively. 'H'	 `G' correspond
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to	 ' , and ` P' , 'F' to '<>' in the modal logic. So it holds the
temporal correspondence of the modal logical equivalence 0. p –I q p
that Pp p, Fp p. Otherwise, the Prior's tense logic is to
understand as a two-fold modal logic, in the sense that it consists of the
two modal parts, i.e. H-P-part and G-F-part.
From the logical point of view, his analysis has some interesting points,
but in order to apply it to the semantic analysis of natural languages, it
has some faults.
First, it cannot treat the accumulation of temporal expressions
adequately. E.g., we cannot but analyze
(9) *Yesterday, John will leave town
either
(9a) YFp
or
(9b) FYp.
(Here, p' stands for the sentence radical 'He leaves town.' , 'Y' is the
operator which means 'yesterday, it was the case that ...' .) But (9a) means
that he will leave town, and (9b) means that he left town yesterday. And
neither of them explain the ungrammaticality of (9). To improve this, we
must use a logical language by means of which the past tense and
yesterday are combined in parallel. The systems in Rescher/
Urquhart(1971), Dowty(1979) make it possible. Based on this method, (9) is
analyzed as
(9') V t[Fut(t) A yesterday(t) A AT(t,p)].
(9') means that there is a time point t, which belongs to the future and
yesterday, where the event that John leaves town occurs. It's obviously
false, which explains the semantic inconsistency of (9).
Prior's system treats the time in an implicit and egocentric form using the
tense operators. But this system expresses time directly using the time
point variable t. In fact, the latter system is an extension of the former.
And we use the latter in what follows.
The second fault of Prior's system is that the formulae are interpreted
with respect to a time point. As to the stative sentences, this method can
be applied consistently. Then the stative sentence as (2) is considered to
be true or false at every time point. But this method poses a difficulty
with the 'non-stative sentences. non-stative means a motion. And in
order to identify the motion, we must compare the states of at least two time
points and find out a locational difference between them. E.g., if Z3) is
true, the location of John's legs are different between two adjacent time
points, and if (5) is true, we must identify John's painting a picture not at a
time point, but in a time interval. For this reason, Dowty(1979) uses the
interval semantics and interprets the sentences with respect to a time
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interval.
In spite of the adequate appearance of interval semantics, there are some
objections, such as Galton(1984, 1987), LObner(1988) which advocate the
event calculus. In the interval semantics, the stative as well as the
non-stative are treated as a proposition. But they recognize a serious
difference between thee, and argue that the stative is a proposition, true
or false with respect to every time point, but the non-stative is not a
proposition, but an event. It's a " temporal" individual s
 constituted from
atomic stative propositions. In fact, the Aktionsarten in (1) are originally
constructed from stative propositions at each time point. In this sense, the
difference between stative and non-stative resembles the one between mass
nouns and count nouns as Mourelatos(1981:202ff.), Galton(1984:28) suggest.
Necessarily, the event exists not at a time point, but in a time interval.
Therefore, the interval semanticists interpret the non-stative sentences
with respect to a time interval. But Galton(1987:171) argues that the event
has no truth value, because it's an individual. Nonetheless, if a
non-stative sentence has a truth value, it precisely means that such and
such an event exists in the past, present, or future. But then, it's not a
non-stative sentence any more, but a stative sentence. From this, Galton
points out that the interval semanticists confuse the truth at an interval
with the truth of an interval. The proposition cannot have an truth value
at an interval, but only at a time point. And this refutes the position of
interval semantics.
An advantage of event calculus is that it can express the difference
between the state and the event clearly. I give in the following some
examples for it from Galton(1984) and LObner(1988):
(10) [Ltibner]
a) Z(t) & Past*(t),
b) E(e) & Past*( (e)).
(10a) is an analysis of a stative sentence in the past tense, (10b) is its
non-stative correspondence. Z represents a stative sentence radical, and
denotes a set of time intervals. E represents a non-stative sentence
radical, and it denotes an event. Past*(t) means that t is before the speech
event e* of the sentence. i is the function which assigns an occurence of
the event E the interval which it occupies.
(11) [Galton]
a) Perf E,
b) Prof' E,
c) Pros E.
Perf, Frog, Pros stand for ' perfect
	 ' progressive , ' prospective '
respectively. But they are merely the event-form correspondence of the
Prior's F, "now" -operator, and F without any aspectual implication.
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The method in (10), (11) is apt to differentiate the event from the
proposition, as well as the perfective from the imperfective. But it has a
major defect, i.e. the event is treated as an 'individual' , and it's hard to
analyze its inner structure. E.g., the accomplishment sentence
(5) John painted a picture
can be analyzed as
(5') V ttPast(t) A AT(t, Vx(picture(x) A paint(j,x)])].
In (5'), picture(x) denotes a proposition, but paint(j,x) an event.
Then, A between them does not connect the propositions, but a proposition
and an event. And it's not clear what kind of entity picture(x) A paint(j,x)
is. Is it a proposition, an event, or any other entity?
Galton(1984) partly formulates the inner structure of an occurence of an
event. E.g., (11a) is further analyzed into the following forms:
(12) a) Perf Ingr p = P*(P — p A p),
b) Perf Po p = P*(P(P — p A p) A —p).
Here, E in (11a) is analyzed into Irzgr p or Po p. Ingr, Po stand for
ingressive and pofative respectively. P* means non-past. So,	 Perf Ingr p
means that a change from p to p occured in the past, and 'Po p' means
that p continued for a while in the past. It's an excellent analysis in that
it grasps the two basic elements, the duration of a state and its change. But
if we try to analyze the structure further, we have to face the same problem
as in (5'). Moreover, (12) doesn't give the direct definition of the events
Ingr p and Po p, but indirectly in a propositional context. In general, the
complication of the system is a drawback of the two-sorted semantics, and
because it does not seem to be able to set up a clearcut, simple theory
which would hold the distinction between the state and the event, and avoid
the above-mentioned difficulty, it's not adequate to use the event calculus
for the precise analysis of temporal expressions.
Further, the Galton's refutation of interval semantics does not seem to
be crucial. Even if he's right in saying that every sentence in natural
languages is stative, it does not prevent us from interpreting a sentence
radical - which is already a theoretical construction - as true or false with
respect to an interval, in the sense that a sentence radical is true with
respect to an interval iff an occurence of the event, which the sentence
radical denotes, exists in the interval.
Although the distinction between the state and the event becomes vague
in the interval semantics, no problem with the two-sorted semantics in the
event calculus appears in the interval semantics, and the semantic
interpreation is applied to the inner structure of the Aktionsarten
elastically. For this reason, I use the interval semantics in the following,
and derive various temporal properties which are often showed up clearly in
the event calculus indirectly.
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As to the interpretation of temporal expressions, the following two
points should be also considered: The first problem concerns the epistemic
asymmetry of the past and the future. The state of affairs in the past is
definite, but a cognitive uncertainty is involved in the future. In order to
grasp it, I assume - based on Dowty(1979) - the branching possible worlds in
the course of time as follows:
(13)
	 ww 3
	  W 0
W 2
W 4
It becomes further important in the interpretation of the progressive. But
notice that it does not mean the branching of time, because the time can be
compared between different worlds, as in the following sentence:
(14) If I'd been there, I would be dead now.
The time as such is a strict linear ordering, i.e. a transitive, irreflexive,
successive, linear ordering. For simplicity, I further assume the
discreteness of time, so that the time structure is isomorph to the set of
integers as follows:
(15)
-> t
The second problem concerns the interpretation of deictic expressions
such as tense, adverbs such as 'yesterday' etc. I argued in Komatsu(1989)
that, besides the indices of possible world and time, we need the index of
context which is independent of them, in order to interpret deictic
expressions. A logical formula is then interpreted with respect to a
contextual-intensional model C, possible world w, time interval i, context
c, and variable assignment g as follows:
(16) 1:1(w,i,c,g;	 ).
3. Temporal Expressions in English
First, I formalize the functions of tense and aspect by means of S, E,
i.e. time of speech, time of reference, and time of event of Reichenbach
(1947). E. g., (17), (18), (19), (20) are analyzed as (17'), (18'), (19'), (20')
respectively:
(17) I had seen John.
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	> t
E	 R	 S
(18) I saw John.
(18')
E,R
(R1	 R„)
(19) I have seen John.
(19')
t
S,R
(20) I have been seeing John.
(20')
E	 S,R
( ) R2 1R3	R0,111)
(18) means that the past tense sets R before S, and this R is E at the same
time. And (20) means that the present sentence sets R at the same time as S,
the perfect aspect sets E before R, and the progressive aspect extends this
E.
In general, there is a series of time intervals as follows:
(21) (S=)Ro--0 -• --)Rk R1c.1	 " • • --+ Rn(=E) (05- k  n-1)
T	 Ask	 (T:tense, Ask:aspect)
Here, S=R0, E=Rn. A tense T determines Ri
 from Ro, and an aspect As k (k  1)
determines B k.,. from R k. So in (18), the past tense directly determines
E(=R1) from S(=Ro). But in (20), E is determined as the last element of the
series R0 —4 R1 -0 R2 s".0 R3.
But the aspect Ask
 further detemines if the state of affairs which occurs
in Ric+1 is viewed perfectively or imperfectively. If 40 denotes such a state
of affairs, Imp( ) means that se) is viewed imperfectively, and Pft( ) means
that	 is viewed perfectively, and they are interpreted as
(22) (v,i,c,g;Imp(
	 ))=1 iff for all i' g_ i Z (w,i',c,g; qb )=1,
(23) cC (v,i,c,g;Pft( ))=1 iff a)	 (w,i',c,g; )=1, and b) there is no
interval i' such that i Ci' , and	 (w,i i ,c,g; )=1
respectively.
(22) implies that if Imp( it$ ) is true, then R g-	 and if ib is true at E.,
then	 is true at every subinterval of E. And (23) implies that if Pft( 95) is
true, then E g- R, and there is no genuine subinterval of E where 4 is true.
Now, a sentence with a tense and some aspects is formulated in the
following scheme:
(17')
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(24) V ti[T(ti) A AT(ti,ASi( Ask(... Asn-1( )•••)•••))].
T T
	Ri
 Past	 Prog
	
Pres	 Perf	 Imp
	
Fut	 Pdf 1',1	 Pft
As'k[n,tk.1] A AT(tk.i,Akk.l
Here,	 n	 is not the deictic, but an aspectual	 now' -operator, is the
same as 't' in 'AT(t,' directly left of it. (Cf. 1. in 5.5.)
3.1 Simple Tense
Following (24), a sentence with a simple tense is formulated as follows:
Past(t1)
(25) V tit	 Pres(t 1 )	 A AT(t 1 , )].
Fut(t1)
The first problem about (25) concerns the interpretation of Past, Pres,
Fut. As to Past, Fut, I simply assume the function as in (7c). But according
to Dowty, the present tense contains the following problem: Stative
sentences as
(26) John is a student
have a normal present meaning. But non-stative sentences as
(27) John runs,
(28) John dies,
(29) John paints a picture
can only be interpreted to mean a habit or to mean predetermined future.
From this, Dowty assumes that the present sets up the interval which
contains only the time point of speech. With this assumption, the normal
reading of stative sentences and its lack in non-stative sentences are
explained by means of (la-d). In fact, we need to observe only one time
point, in order to determine the truth value of stative sentences. But for
non-stative sentences, we need to observe at least two time points. We can
formulate this function of the present as follows:
(30) ,C (w,i,c,g;Pres(t))=1 iff i is an interval which contains only one time
point, and Z(1,v,i,c,g;t)=en.
The next problem with (25) concerns the interpretation of According
to my linguistic intuition, the simple past and future of stative sentences is
imperfective, and that of non-stative sentences is perfective. So the simple
tenses are formulated as follows:
(31) [Present]
V ti[Pres(ti) A KAti, )].4
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w$
wip 
	 > W 0EE 
R
w2
w4
(32) (Past]
a) Stative: V t i [Past(ti) A AT(ti,Imp( ))3.
b) Non-stative: V ti(Past(ti) n AT(ti,Pft( ))].
(33) [Future]
a) Stative: V ti[Fut(ti) A AT(t i ,Imp( ))].
b) Non-stative: V ti[Futai) A AT(t 1 ,Pft( ))].
Imp, Pft in (32), (33) are default values of sentences without explicit
aspectual determination.
3.2 Aspects
3.2.1 Progressive
According to Reichenbach(1947), Dowty(1979), the progressive aspect
extends R. This explains the fact that
(34) John is painting a picture.
doesn't imply the completion of the picture. So we can define Prog 1 ( ) as
follows:
(35) Progi(	 V t[n t n AT(t,Pft( ))].
But the progressive contains another problem called " imperfective
paradox" . I.e.
(36) John was painting a picture
doesn't imply
(6) John painted a picture.
In order to explain this, Dowty(1979) assumes a set of worlds which will
appear after R in a normal course of time, and interprets that a progressive
sentence is true iff, in each of such worlds and an extended interval of R,
the sentence radical is true. Dowty calls such worlds inertia worlds. The
lack of implication from (36) to (6) is explained as a case where the real
world doesn't belong to the set of inertia worlds. I introduce the modal
operator Inr which assign the set of inertia worlds to each possible world,
and revise (35) to
(37) Prog( ) Inr(V tEn C t A AT(t,Pft( ))]).
(36) is then formulated as
(36') V ti[Past(ti) A AT(t1,Prog(p))],
and its truth condition is illustrated as follows:
(36")
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Further, as the following deduction (38) shows, Prog(
	 ) implies
Inr(Imp(Prog 1 ( c ))):
(38) Prog( q5 )
Inr(
	 an	 t A AT(t,Pft( ))))
Inr(A t 1 Ct 1	
-+V 1. 2Et1	 t 2 A AT(t2,Pft( ))]])
Inr(A t 1 Ct 1 g_ rz AT(ti, V t2in c t 2 A AT(t2,Pft( 41) ))])])
lnr( A tiCti c n AT(ti,Progi( q5 ))))
Inr(Imp(Prog i ( q5))).
I.e. a progressive sentence denotes a stative that 66 is in progress with
respect to each inertia world.5
3.2.2 Perfect
In spite of various discussions, there is no final solution to the meaning
of the perfect yet. But when it comes to the present perfect, it seems to be
commonly accepted that it describes
(39) a) an event in the past
b) in relation to the present.
Dowty(1979) - and already Bryan(1936) formulates this as follows: The
perfect sets up an interval R2 which extends from the interval R1 determined
by the tense into the past, and expresses that the event denoted by the
sentence radical occurs in a subinterval R3 of R2 perfectively. This
formulation is illustrated as follows:
(40)
R 2
	
R 3 (=E)	 v-RI,R0(=S)
[	 E•11	 > t
And the perfect is defined as
(41) Perf 1( ) V ti[PN(ti) A AT(t 1 ,	 t2 [t2 Cn A AT(t2,Pft( ))])].
(Here, PN' denotes the set of intervals whose last time point is the same
as that of the interval which the tense determines.) In (40), R2 expresses
(39b), and R3 (39a).
But in reality, (41) doesn't represent the meaning of (39b). Based on
Comrie(1976:Chap.3), LObner(1988) argues that (39b) implies one of the
following meanings of the perfect:
(42) a) perfect of result,
b) experiential perfect.
If we interpret the following sentence
(43) Sie ist aufgestanden (LObner,178)
(She's stood up.)
in the meaning of (42a), it means that she's standing now. This could be
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generally captured as the state at the next moment of the interval where
the sentence radical occurs. But LObner(1988) points out that (43) can imply
other factors, e.g., she is a patient, and her condition's got worse by her
standing up, or conversely, she showed a sudden turn of her condition for
the better etc.
Further,
(44) Bill has gone to America (Comrie,1976:59)
is an example of the perfect of result. But
(45) Bill has been to America (Ibid.)
expresses the experiential perfect. Then, the distinction between (42a) and
(42b) is a lexical or contextual problem.
From this, it's concluded that the meaning of perfect is hardly captured
semantically, but mostly belongs to the pragmatics. So I can at most add to
(41) a pragmatic operator have which implies the various meanings of
perfect according to contexts, define the perfect as follows
(46) Perf( 95) =--- have(Perfi( )),
and assume the following meaning postulate:
(47) q (Perf( ) -' (Perf 1 ( ))].
The meaning of the sentence
(48) John has painted a picture
is then formulated as
(48') V ti[Pres(ti) A AT(ti,have(
( E- -V t2 [PN(t2) A AT(t2 , V t3[ t3 c n A AT(t3,Pft(p))M,
p is the sentence radical of (48).),
and by means of (47), (48') implies
(48") V ti[Pres(ti) A AT(t 1 , 95 )].
3.2.3 Predetermined Future
Sometimes, sentences with the present tense are used to express an event
in the future, as is observed in the following sentence:
(49) John leaves town tomorrow.
For these types of sentences, Dowty assumes the aspect of predetermined
future which is expressed with IF -morpheme, and means that it's
predetermined at the present that the event denoted by the sentence
radical occurs at a moment in the future in all possible worlds which branch
off in the future.
But it's a dubious argument because of the lack of the surface morpheme.
There is the past tense form of this aspect. E.g., the following sentence
(50) I had cheeseburger with onions (Dowty,1979:160),
in the situation where the waiter brought a wrong order, or the following
German sentence
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(51) Morgen gab es den "Faust" im Theater. (Markus,1977:49)
(direct translation: There was the "Faust" in the theater tomorrow.)
But it does not seem to be a mere accident that other languages also lack
the morpheme of this aspect. E.g., the following English sentence
(52) Tomorrow is Sunday
is also expressed in the present tense in other languages:
(53) a) German: Morgen ist Sonntag,
b) French: Demain, c'est dimanche,
c) Japanese: Asu wa nichiyobi da.
I think that this phenomenon stems from the character of the present
which expresses an unmarkedness in a global sense. In the temporal
dimension, the present was originally unmarked as to the tense. But the
past tense morpheme complementarily gave the present tense the function of
non-past, and the future tense further gave it the function of non-future,
so that the present tense expressed the non-past and the non-future, i.e.
the present. But the present tense rudimentarily posesses the unmarked
temporal functions in the omnitemporal or tenseless statements:
(54) The earth goes round the sun,
(55) 1+1 is 2.
Likewise in the modal dimension, the indicative present expresses the
state of the real world as its default value, and the subjunctive past
expresses a modal distality, i.e. the state of an unreal world. E.g.:
(56) a) I'm rich,
b) I wish I were rich.
And in the dimension of knowledge, the present tense expresses the
kernal of the speaker's knowledge as its default value, in contrast with the
sentence with 'may' , 'can' , 'must' etc. which expresses an uncertainty
or necessity of the speaker's knowledge. So the meaning of the sentences
with the aspect of predetermined future should be explained in the
dimension of the speaker's knowledge, as the kernel of the knowledge such
as a definite plan etc.
In this sense, Dowty is basically false. But on the other hand, it's true
that such an usage of the present has the above-mentioned temporal
function, if the epistemic unmarkedness is projected into the time and
modality. So I formulate the aspect of predertmined future symmetrically
with the perfect aspect as follows:
(57)	 V ti[NF(ti) AT"A	 V 1.2[1'2 n A AT(t2 ,Pft( (I) ))M,
Pdf( ) predetermined El ( ).
W is an modal operator which assigns the set of all possible worlds
which branch off in the future. 'predetermined' is a non-logical, perhaps
pragmatic operator as have , and I assume the following meaning
postulate which corresponds to (47):
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(58) q [Pdf( (I)) -' $ ].
The meaning of the sentence
(49) John leaves town
is then formulated as
(49') V tiEPres(ti) A AT(t 1 ,Pdf( ))]
(	 V t2[NF(t2) A ..A TU 2 , t3[ t3 n A AT(t3,Pft(P))))]
p is the sentence radical of (49).),
and by means of (58), (49') implies
(49") V ti[Pres(ti) A AT(ti, )].
3.3 Temporal Adverbs
Dowty(1979) classifies the temporal adverbs into the following three
categories:
(59) a) tense adverbs: Ro(=S) 
-+ R1,
b) aspect adverbs: Rn(=E),
c) perfect adverbs: R2 -0 R3 (=E) in (40).
Tense adverbs determine Ri from S. Therefore,
(60) John painted a picture yesterday
is formulated as
(60') V ti[Past(ti) A yesterday(t 1 ) A AT(t 1 ,Pft( (i) ))].
This also explains why the present perfect and a past adverb cannot coexist
in a sentence. I.e.
(61) *John has painted a picture yesterday
is formulated as
(61') V tiCPres(ti) A yesterday(t 1 ) A AT(t 1 ,Perf( (I) ))3.
In (61'), ` Pres(ti)' and ` yesterday(ti)' are incompatible.
As aspect adverbs, I consider the following two: for an hour, and in an
hour. But not all sentences are compatible with them, as the following
examples show:
(62) a) John stayed in the town for an hour.
b) John slept for an hour.
c) *John died for an hour.
d) *John painted a picture for an hour.
(63) a) *John stayed in the town in an hour.
b) *John slept in an hour.
c) John died in an hour.
d) John painted a picture in an hour.
This can be explained as follows: Both for an hour' and 'in an hour'
restrict E temporally. But they also determine if E is viewed perfectively
or imperfectively - independent from the aspectual determination by tense.
I.e. they both set up the time interval of an hour. But for an hour'
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further requires that p is viewed imperfectively. But this imperfectivity
must be compatible also with the activity, as is showed by (62b). I call this
kind of imperfectivity amorphousness. (In fact, many linguists don't
distinguish activity from stative. See also Note' 2.) Therefore, I introduce
the operator Imp*, and define its interpretation as follows:
	
(64)	 (11) , i , , g ;	 ( ))=1 iff i contains at least two time points, and for
all i'	 i which contain at least two time points GC (w,i',c,g; q )=1.
Conversely, 'in an hour' requires that p is not viewed amorphously in any
subinterval of E. Their semantic functions are then formulated as follows:
	
(65)	 for an hour: V tiCT(ti) A AT(t 1 ,an-hour(n) A Imp*( ) A As1 ( O))],
(66) ' in an hour: V tiET(ti) A AT(t i ,an-hour(n) A A t2( t2 t1-*AT(t2,
Imp*( (P ))) A Asi(
	
(Here,	 T' and As 1
 are as in (30).	 stands for the logical formula
	
of the sentence radical of a sentence
	 without temporal adverbs which
is formulated as 4 \,/ t i CT(t i ) A AT(ti,Asi( (1) ))]' .) In terms of them, (62a-d),
(63a-d) are formulated as
(62') a) V ti[Past(ti) A AT(t 1 ,an-hour(n) A Imp*(p) A Imp(p))],
b)-d)
	
ti(Past(ti) A AT(t 1 ,an-hour(n) A Imp*(p) A Pft(p))],
(63') a) V t1[Past(t 1 ) A AT(t 1 ,an-hour(n) A A t2[ t2 c t1-0 AT(t2,
---iImp*(p))] A Imp(p))),
b)-d)
	 t i EPast(t i ) A AT(ti,an-hour(n) A A t2U2 _C t i -0 AT(t2,
Imp*(p))] A Pft(p))]
respectively. Then, (62'), (63') explain the grammatical difference of (62),
(63) by means of the compatibility between the aspect determined by the
tense (Imp(p) or Pft(p)), determined by the aspect adverb (Imp*(p) or A I-2[1-2
c t i
 -÷AT(t 2 , ----iImp*(p)), and the Aktionsart (p). E.g., if p' stands for the
sentence radical 'John paints a picture.' , Pft(p) can be true with respect
to the interval I of one hour. But Imp*(p) cannot be true, unless John
paints a picture in every subinterval of I which consists of two time points.
And this explains the oddness of (62d). But if p' stands for the
sentence radical 'John dies.' , Pft(p) is true with respect to the interval I
of one hour, if there is only one subinterval of I which consists of two time
points, and in which p is true. But then, because p cannot be true with
respect to every subinterval of I which consists of two time points, A t2(1-2
C 1. 1 -) AT(t 2 , ---iImp*(p))] is true. Therefore, (63c) can be true.
` since' , 'during' , 'up to' , and also 'for' are examples of perfect
adverbs. They occur with the perfect, but not with the simple tense, as the
following example shows:
a) *slept
(67) John b) has slept since midnight.
c) *sleeps
In this paper, I treat 'since' and 'for' . (67b) and
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(68) John has slept for an hour
are formulated as
(67b') V t i Pres(ti) A AT(ti,have( V t2CPN(/-2) A AT(t 2 , V t3E t3 c n A
t4Cmidnight(t4) A t 4  n] A Imp*(p) A AT(t3,Pft(p))))))))
and
(68') V ti[Pres(ti) A AT(ti,have( V t2(PN(t2) A AT(t2, V t3U3 c n A
an-hour(n) A Imp*(p) A AT(t3,Pft(p))))))))
respectively. Perfective adverbs determine R3 (=E) from R2 in (40). I.e. V
LISmidnight(t4) A t 4 <n] in (67b') or an-hour(n) in (68') restrict t 2 , but Imp*(p)
indirectly restrict t 3 together with AT(t 3 ,Pft(p)), so that t 3=t 2 , and in this
t3 , p occurs amorphously and perfectively. (67b'), (68') then get equal to
(67b") V ti(Pres(ti) A AT(t 1 , V t2[PN(t2) A AT(t2, V t 4(midnight(t4) A 14 n]
A Imp*(p) A Pft(p))])],
c)	 t 1 [Pres(t 1 ) A AT(ti,	 t2EPN(t2) A AT(t2 ,an-hour(t2) n Imp*(p)
Pft(p))])]
respectively, and are illustrated as
(67bw)
midnight
Imp*(p)
t 2 Pft(p)	 ti
)11	 > t
and
(68"')
Imp*(p)
t 2 Pft(p)	 t,
[4•Ji 	 > t
an-hour
respectively.
Perfect adverbs are an intermediate category between tense adverbs and
aspectual adverbs which becomes possisble because of the many-storied
structure of interval determination of the perfect.
3.4 Iterated Aspects
In this section, I only analyze the iteration of the progressive and the
perfect, and the progressive and the predetermined future with a temporal
adverb. The following sentence
165
(69) John has been working on this thesis for two years.
is treated in the same way as (68), but 'la' in (68) is replaced with `Prog(p)
, so that (69) is formulated as
(69') V t i [Pres(t i ) A AT(t 1 ,have(V t2[PN(t2) A AT(t2, t3[t3 n A
two-years(n) A Imp*(Prog(p)) A AT(t3,Pft(Prog(p))))))))],
which implies
(69") V ti(Pres(t i ) A AT(t 1 , V t2[PN(t2) A AT(t 2 , two-years(t2)
Imp*(Prog(p)) A Pft(Prog(p)))M,
i.e. the structure illustrated in
(69'")
t2 Prog(p)
En )1 1	 > t
S)
two-years
In the following sentence
(70) John is leaving town tomorrow,
the progressive is applied to the sentence with the predetermined future,
and the adverb tomorrow' is treated exceptionally as an aspect adverb,
and introduced with the predetermined future. (70) is formulated as
(70') V t i [Pres(t i ) A AT(t 1 ,Prog(predetermined 1[1(V t2[NF(t2)
AT(t 2 , V t 3 [ t3 C_ n A AT(t 3 , tomorrow(n) A Pft(p))))))))].
As Dowty(1979:154ff.) says, the assertion of (70) is weaker than that of
(49) John leaves town tomorrow,
because of the progressive.6
4. Temporal Expressions in German
In this chapter, I compare the semantic functions of temporal expressions
of German with English.
As to the tense, the German past and future have the same function as the
English. But in German, the non-stative sentences with simple present are
possible as
(71) Hans malt ein Gemälde.
(Hans is painting a picture.)
In order for (71) to be possible, E must contain at least two time points.
(The progressive of its English translation suggests it.) This means that in
German, the constraint on E becomes elastic, and E only needs to contain the
time point of speech, so that the constraint on the length of E is the same
as the past and the future.
But it's not certain if (71) has further modal implications of the
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progressive. In fact, the following sentence
(72) Hans malte ein Gemalde,
the past form of (71), is interpreted only as the perfective past.' For this
reason, I formulate the German simple tenses in the same way as English (31),
(32), (33). But the interpretation of Pres is a bit altered as follows:
(30') Z(w,i,c,g;Pres(t))=1 iff E(w,i,c,g;t)Dcn.
And it's assumed that the progressive doesn't exist in German.
However, the other two aspects in English - the perfect and the
predetermined future - exist also in German. We already saw an example of
the predetermined future in (53a). And the following sentence
(73) Hans ist abgereist.
(He has left (town).)
is an example of the German present perfect. And these two aspects are
formulated in the same manner as in English.
Insofar as tense adverbs occure in sentences with a simple tense, we can
treat them as aspect adverbs. E.g., as formulations of
(60) John painted a picture yesterday,
(60') V ti[Past(ti) A yesterday(ti) A AT(ti,Pft( (1) ))3,
and
(60") V t i[Past(t 1) A AT(ti,yesterday(n) A Pft( ))]
are the same. But in English, if we treat 'yesterday' as an aspect adverb,
we cannot explain the ungrammaticality of
(61) *John has painted a picture yesterday,
because it's formulated as
(61") V t i [Pres(t i ) A AT(ti,have( V t2[PN(t2) A AT(t2, V t3[t3 g_ n
AT(t3 ,yesterday(n) A Pft(p)))))))],
and (61) can be true. But if 'yesterday' is treated as a tense adverb, (61)
is formulated as
(61') V ti[Pres(ti) A yesterday(ti) A AT(t i ,Perf( ))],
and (61') is always false. From this, we can conclude the existence of tense
adverbs in English. But in German, adverbs which explicitely denote a past
time can occur with the present perfect as
(74) Hans ist gestern abgereist.
Then, we need not to assume the tense adverbs in German.
Further, the German correspondence of English perfect adverbs occurs
not with the present perfect, but with the simple present as
(75) Hans schltift seit Mitternacht.
(*Hans sleeps since midnight.)
In order to explain this, we only need to assume that such type of adverbs
in German functions as aspect adverbs, which is clarified by
(75') V t i (Pres(t i ) A ARti, V ta[Mitternacht(t2) A ta n] A Imp*(p)
Pft(p))].
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From this, we can conclude that there is only one category of adverbs,
i.e. aspect adverbs, in German.
In conclusion, there are three tenses in German as in English. But the
constraint on the present tense in German is more elastic than in English.
German lacks the progressive, so that there are only two aspects, i.e. the
perfect and the predetermined future. Further, there's no need to assume
the tense adverbs and the perfect adverbs, so that only aspect adverbs are
required in German.
From this, it can be concluded that English is - as to temporal
expressions - more analytic than German. Conversely, the latter
supplements the lack with pragmatic elements.
5. Formal Part
This chapter is a revised version of Dowty(1979,351-368), Komatsu(1989:
76-94).
5.1 Model Structure for the Aspectual Logic AL
=<E,W,M,C,<Af,Raw,$› is a model structure for AL defined as follows:
(1) E is a non-empty set (the set of entities).
(2) W is a non-empty set (the set of possible worlds).
(3) M is a non-empty set (the set of moments of time).
(4) <iv, is a transitive, irreflexive, successive, discrete, and linear
ordering on M. (<M is the erlier-than-relation on M, and is isomorph
to the smaller-than-relation on the set of integers.)
(5) The set of time intervals I is the set of all subsets i of If such that if
i E I, then for all m1,m2,m3 E M, if m1 ,m3 E I, and m1<mm2<mm3, then m2 E i.
For ii,i2 E I, ii<i 2 iff for all m1	and m2 E i2; in1<mm2. And i2>ii,
iff il<i2.
The minimal (maximal) element of i is m E i such that for all m'
m<Mm' (m>mm'), or m=m' .
i t is a co-initial (co-final) interval of i 2 iff the minimal (maximal)
element of i t is equal to the minimal (maximal) element of i2.
i 1	 i 2 (12	 iff i i is a co-initial (co-final) subinterval of i2.
(6) C is a non-empty set (the set of contexts).
For c E C, cn is a time interval with only one time point in it
(regarded as the time interval of speech in c), and ca E W (regarded as
the actual world in c).
(7) Let "	 i2 " abbreviate "for all m1 E i i there exists m2 E i 2 such
that mi <m2 " . Then 13 is a three-place relation in WxWxi such that (a)
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if <wi ,w2 ,i> E R then for all i' E I such that	 <wi,w2,is> E R, and
(b) where 11' is that two-place relation such that <w 1 ,w2>	 iff for
some i,
	
	 E R R' is transitive, reflexive and symmetric. ( "
E R" is read "world w1 exactly like world w2 at all times up
to and including i" .
(8) Iw is a function from WxI into subsets of W such that if w1 E Iw(<w2,i>),
then <w1,w2 ,i> E R, for all w1,w2 E W, i E I. (I.e. the "inertia worlds"
for a given index <w,i> are always a subset of the worlds that are
exactly like iv up to i, according to R.)
(9) $ is a function that assigns to each wi E W a set of sets of members of
W, designated $wi , such that (a) $wi is centered on wt. , (b) $wi is
nested, (c) $wi
 is closed under unions, and (d) $w i is closed under
non-empty intersections. (I.e. each set in $wi is a set of worlds that
are all equally similar to wi ; cf. Lewis(1973:14).)
5.2 Definition of Types
The set of types is the smallest set T such that (1) e, t, and i are in T
(regarded as the types of entities, truth values and time intervals
respectively), and (2) if a,b E T, then <a,b> E T.
5.3 Set of Possible Denotations, Intensions, and Characters
For each type a E T, the set Da of possible denotations of type a is
defined recursively as follows: (a) De=E, (b) Dt=(0,1) (the truth values "
false" and "true" respectively), (c) Di =I, and (d) D<a.b>=DbDa.
Further, the set Sa (Cha) of possible intensions (characters) is defined
as DaWx1 (DaC).
5.4 Model for AL
=	 ,F,K > is a contextual-intensional model for AL, and * =
C,w,i,c,g> is a model for AL.
The set of constants, variables, and indexicals with an arbitrary type a
are expressed with Cona, Vara, and Inda respectively. Then:
F: Co na*-01)aw'ci;
K: Inda -+ Da';
w E W;
I;
c C;
g: Vara -*Da.
If u E Vara, and x E Da, then g`51(=(g\(<u,g(u)>)) U {<u,x>).
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5.5 Meaningful Expressions of AL and their Interpretation
The set of meaningful expressions of AL of type a, MEa, is defined as
follows, together with the recursive definition of the denotation of a
meaningful expression a with respect to a model
	 denoted by
•
1. a E Cone, then a E MEa, and C (w,i,c,g; a )=F( )(<w,i>).
j(i.e. John) E Con!;
picture Con<,,t›;
paint E Con<a.<,,t>>;
an-hour, midnight, Mitternacht E Con<t.t>;
predetermined, have E Con<t.t>;
n (i.e. aspectual now) E Con k , and L(w,i,c,g;0=i.
2. If u E Vara, then u E MEa, and L(w,i,c,g;0=g(u).
x,x1,x2,•••;Y,Y1,Y2,... E Vara;
P,P1,P2,•••;(4,Q1,Q2,••• E Var<„,t,;
t, t i , t2,... E Vart;
E Vart.
3. If a E Inds, then a E MEa, and Z(,v,i,c,g; a )=K( a )(c).
Past, Pres, Fut, yesterday, tomorrow E Ind<f.t›, and for e E ME,,
(u),i,c,g;Past( ))=1 iff C (w,i,c,g; E' )<cn;
(w,i,c,g;Pres( e ))=1 iff
in English:	 (w,i,c,g;	 )=cn,
in German: GC (w,i,c,g;	 ?cn;
GC: (w,i,c,g;Fut( e ))=1 iff L(v,i,c,g;	 )>cn;
(D, , c, g; ye s te rd a y( C ))=1 (E (w,i,c,g; tomorrow( E ))=1) iff C (w,i,c,g; )
is a subinterval of the day before (after) cn.
4. If a E ME<a, b> and 13 E MEa, then a (
	
MEb, and GC (w,i,c,g; a ( p
(w,i,c,g; a )(GC (w,i,c,g; (I)).
5. If a, 13 E MEa, then [ a =	 MEt, and GC (w,i,c,g;[ a = P D=1 iff dC (w,i,
c,g; a )=GC(w,i,c,g;
	 ).
6. If 66 E MEt, then	 E MEt , and C (w,i,c,g;	 )=1 iff	 (w,i, c,g;
)=0. (Similarly for n, V, -4 , and 44.)
7. If 'I) E ME t and u E Vara, then V u E MEt, and GC(w,i,c,g; V u )=1 iff
there exists x such that(w,i,c,g; )=1. (Similarly for Au .)
8. If	 E ME W , then q 	 MEt, and C (w,i,c,g; q )=1 iff C (w',P,c,g;
)=1, for all w' E W and i' E I.
9. If 9$ E MEt, then	 q$ E MEt, and E(w,i,c,g; II )=1 iff for all w' such
that <w,w',i> E R,	 )=1.
10. If (fr E MEt, then Become 11) E MEW, and E (v,i,c,g;Become )=1 iff (1) for
some co-initial interval j of i, L (w,j,c,g; )=4; (2) for some co-final
interval k of i, C (w,k,c,g; 9$ )=1; and (3) there is no i' Ci such that (1)
a)
1E1
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and (2) hold for	 as well as i.
11. If sb, (i) E ME W , then C (1) And (1) MEW, and (w,i,c,g;[ cto And 4i ])=1 iff
(1) for some j C_ i, C (w, j,,g; )=1; (2) for some kLi, r:(u),k,c,g, 0)=1;
and (3) there is no	 i such that (1) and (2) hold for P.
12. If 4 E MEW, then Inr( ib) E ME W , and C (w,i,c,g;Inr( ))=1 iff for some i'
such that i CP, and for all w' E Iw(<w,i>), C (w',P,c,g; q$ )=1.
13. If E ME W , then [ (fr q -3 4 ] E ME W , and GC(w,i,c,g;[ 0-4 4 ])=1 iff
either (1) there is no set S E $,„ for which there is iv' E S such that C
(w,i',c,g; q$ )=1, or else (2) there is some set S E $w such that GC (wt,i,c,g;
q$ )=1 for some w' E S, and for all w" E S, (w",i,c,g; q$ -4 )=1. (Cf.
Lewis(1973:16).)
14. If 95,	 E ME W , then	 Cause	 E ME W , and	 (w,i,c,g;[ Cause (1) ])=1
iff L(w,i,c,g;[ (f) 0-* cP ])=1 and L(w,i,c,g;[	 13-4 —4 ])=1.8
15. If	 E ME W ,	 E ME I , then AT( t , ) E ME W , and C (w,i,c,g; AT( , q$ ))=1
iff	 )=1, where i'=:(w,i,c,g; C).
16. If	 E ME I , then PN( ) E ME W (NF( ) E ME W), and cC,(w,i,c,g;PN( ))=1 (
(w,i,c,g;NF(
	 ))=1) iff C (w,i,c,g;	 ) is a co-final (co-initial)
interval) of i.
17. If C, E E MEI, then [ < e ([ C _e])E ME W , and	 (w,i,c,g;[ < e ])=1
(	 (w,i,c, g;(	 ])=1) iff C (w,i,c,g,	 )<GC (w,i,c,g;	 ) (	 (w,i,c,g; C )
L.< E(w,i,c,g;	 )).
18. If	 MEI, then ICCEJE ME W (1	 E MEW), and ,C(w,i,c,g;[ C
▪ ]) =1	 (w,i,c,g;[ C c	 ])=1) iff	 C ) is a (genuine)
subinterval of Z(w,i,c,g; ).
19. If	 E ME W , then Imp( 4;6 ) E ME W , and E (w,i,c,g;Imp( ))=1 iff for all i'
g_ 	 (w,i',c,g; (/) )=I.
20. If ib E ME W , then Imp*( tfr ) E ME W, and ))=1 iff i
contains at least two time points, and for any i t g_ i which contains at
least two time points,
	
(w,i',c,g; yb )=1.
21. If	 E ME W , then Pft(	 ) E ME W , and £ (w,i,c,g;Pft( q$ ))=1 iff (1)
(w,i',c,g; )=1, and (2) there is no interval	 such that i CP, and L
,c,g; f )=1.
If c E C, then <ca,cn,c> is an index of possible utterance. All
interpretations of qb E ME W which corresponds to a sentence of a natural
language begin with E (ca,en,c,g; (/) ).
If 40 E ME W ,	 is true in the context c with respect to	 iff for all g'
(ca,cn,c,g';	 )=1.
41) is analytic iff for all c,g in an arbitrary C, C (ca,cn,c,g; it$ )=1.
In an obvious case, the square brackets ` C ]' are eliminated.
The following abbreviations are employed:
a ( p ,	 a ( Y )( P),
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for 95 E MEt:
Progi ( 95 ) V tin	 t A AT(t,Pft( ))],
Prog( ) Inr(V ttn c t A AT(t,Pft( ))D,
Perf i ( ) V ti[PN(ti) A AT(ti, V t2(t2 c n A AT(t2,Pft( (i) ))])],
Perf( ) =have(Perf i ( )),
Pdf( P ) = predetermined UN ti[NF(ti) A AT(
	 t2[ t 2 c n A AT( t2,
Pft( ))]A).
5.6 Meaning Postulates
For the interpretation of meaningful expressions of AL, only the
contextual-intensional models in which the following meaning postulates are
analytic are permitted:
MPl. Vx q [ 8 =x], where 6 is j.
MP2. (Stative)
Ax	 (x) HA t[t g n -0AT(t, Y (x))]], where y translates a stative
intransitive phrase.
MP3. (Activity)
V PA x q [ Y (x) --+ [P(x) And --IP(x)]], where y translates an activity
intransitive phrase.
MP4. (Achievement)
VPAx0( 'Y (x) <-4 Become P(x)J, where y translates an achievement
intransitive phrase.
MP5. (Accomplishment)
VPVQAx q [ 8 (x,y) P(x) Cause Become Q(y)], where 8 translates an
accomplishment transitive phrase.
In the following, let it) E MEt.
MP6. q (have( )
	 ].
MP7. q [predetermined( 95 )
	
].
Notes
1 The stative and the imperfective might be considered as the same. But the
former is a state of affairs as such, in contrast, the latter is a way of
viewing it. In fact, the following sentence
(i) He's been to America before
is a stative, but perfective sentence, i.e. the state of his having been in
America is viewed perfectively.
2 They treat the stative and the activity in (1) as the stative, and the
accomplishment and the achievement as the non-stative. The motional
difference between the stative and the activity in (1) is ignored.
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3 This view is maintained by Liibner(1988). Galton(1987:176) gives the
non-stative sentences the set of the pairs <A,B> as their denotations. A is
the set of time points before an occurence of the event which a
non-stative sentence denotes, B is the set of time points after the
occurence. And the occurence of the event happens in the period between
A and B. Anyway, <A,B> is another entity than the truth value.
4 This could also be formulated as follows:
(i)	 tiCPres(ti) A AT(t 1 ,Imp(	 ))].
In fact, (30) gives (31) and (i) the same truth condition. (i) also gives a
unified formulation with the past and future correspondence (32), (33) with
Imp( q5 ) or Pft( ). Further, the present looks at the situation from
inside, and, as Comrie(1976:4) says, this is also a property of imperfective.
So, (i) seems to be preferable to (31). But, as we see in Chap.4, the
opposition Pft/Imp is cancelled in German present. Further, (i) is derived
from (31) using (30). For this reason, I formulate the semantic function of
the present as (31).
5 Some linguists, e.g. LObner, don't accept the existence of inertia worlds,
and leave the properties of the progressive aspect, such as imperfective
paradox, to pragmatics. Indeed, pragmatics is similar to a waste basket in
which all that doesn't seem to be explained in semantics is squeezed. But
LObner's refutation concerns the branching of time(1988:183). And even if
he intends the branching of possible worlds by that, the phenomenon which
can be explained in the semantics must be expalined in it. And also
Galton(1984:133-143) - though in an implicit, vague form - reaches the same
conception as the Dowty's. For this reason, I adopted the branching
structure of possible worlds here.
6 In general, it's better to begin the analysis with (69),(70) without adverbs,
i .e.
(i) John has been working on this thesis,
(ii) John is leaving town.
In fact, Dowty(1979:359) analyzes the predetermined future with this method.
But the formulations of (i), (ii), i.e.
(i') V ti[Pres(ti) A AT(ti,have( V t2[PN(t2) A AT(t2, t31/-3 c n A
AT(t3,Pft(Prog(p)))])]))],
(ii') V ti[Pres(ti) A AT(ti,Prog(predetermined Ed (V t [NIF(t2) A
AT(t2, V t 3 [ t 3 c rz A AT(t3,Pft(P))DD)]
contain some problems. I.e. (i') doesn't exclude the case that John isn't
working on the thesis now, and (ii') the case that John leaves town in the
non-future.
This might be considered as a defect of the present analysis. But the
lack of the temporal adverbs in (i), (ii) doesn't seem normal to me. In fact,
you feel like to ask "how long" or "when" , if you hear (i) or (ii). So, I
think that, in (69), (70) (and also (49)), the temporal adverbs appear
obligatorily, and (P), (ii') conversely explain the anomaly of (i'), (ii').
7 The German correspondence of
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(i) Hans was painting a picture
must be expressed by totally other expressions, such as
(ii) Hans beschãftigte sich mit der Herstellung eines Gemaides.
8 This formulation represents the necessary and sufficient reason in Spohn
(1983:268).
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